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Abstract. In the past decade analysis of big data has proven to be
extremely valuable in many contexts. Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
is a state-of-the-art approach which allows statistical computations while
protecting each individual user’s privacy. Unlike Differential Privacy no
trust in a central authority is necessary as noise is added to user inputs
locally. In this paper we give an overview over different LDP algorithms
for problems such as locally private heavy hitter identification and spatial
data collection. Finally, we will give an outlook on open problems in LDP.
Keywords: Local differential privacy, privacy, differential privacy
1 Introduction
With the advance of big data analytics and its value for businesses there has
been an ever-growing interest in collecting statistics from user data to improve
products and to gain valuable insights. However, valuable information is often
highly sensitive to the users and can not be collected without giving strong
privacy guarantees to users. In the past decade an approach called Differential
Privacy [13] which gives strong privacy guarantees for users has risen to popu-
larity. They key idea behind differential privacy is that a user is given plausible
deniability by adding random noise to their input. In the centralized Differential
Privacy setting noise is added to the database. As the type of noise added is
known statistical queries can still be computed by filtering out the noise while
maintaining each user’s individual privacy. However, this approach to Differen-
tial Privacy requires users to have trust the database maintainer to keep their
privacy.
A stronger privacy guarantee for each individual users can be given in the
local setting as there is no need to trust a centralized authority. Local Differential
Privacy (LDP) was first formalized in [17] although an equivalent definition
under the name “amplification” had already been introduced by [15]. In the
local setting each user encodes and perturbs their own inputs before transmitting
them to the untrusted server. This server can then compute statistical queries
on the input data. The local settings poses its own challenges however. As each
user perturbs their input individually the total variance is higher and in fact
depends on the number of participants n [3]. LDP has been a quickly developing
field with many new state-of-the-art approaches to important problems in LDP
coming out in recent years [3,5,7,26,27]. Although the key idea behind LDP is
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relatively old [28] it has only recently risen to popularity and seen practical
deployments by major technology organizations such as Apple [1], who use it
to collect usage statistics and find commonly used emojis, new words that are
not part of the dictionary yet and to improve user behaviour, Google [14], who
use it in Chrome to collect commonly chosen homepages, settings, and other
web browsing behaviour, and Microsoft [10], who use it for their collection of
telemetry data.
In this paper we give an introduction to Local Differential Privacy and present
some of its applications. We then provide an overview of current state-of-the-art
solutions to problems in Local Differential Privacy such as general frequency
oracles, heavy hitter identification, itemset mining and locally private spatial
data collection. Finally, we give a short outlook on the future of Local Differential
Privacy and present some of its open problems.
2 Local Differential Privacy
In differential privacy the introduction of noise by randomization is crucial to
ensure privacy through plausible deniability. We will first introduce the cen-
tralized notion of differential privacy called -differential privacy. [12] defines
-differential privacy (-DP) as follows:
Definition 1. A randomized function K gives -differential privacy if for all
data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S]
Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] ≤ e

One major problem with this centralized notion of Differential Privacy is that
users still have to trust a central authority, namely the database maintainer, to
keep their privacy. In order to be able to give users stronger privacy guarantees
the concept of Local Differential Privacy (LDP) was introduced. The to LDP
definition equivalent notion of “amplification” was first introduced by [15], and
while the idea of local privacy was first formalized in [17] it rose to prominence
through the work by Duchi et al. [11]. LDP algorithms have been implemented
and used in practice and we will introduce two such deployments by Apple and
Google. We will use the definition of LDP given by [14].
Definition 2. We say that an algorithm pi satisfies -Local Differential Privacy
where  > 0 if and only if for any input v and v′
∀y ∈ Range(pi) : Pr[pi(v) = y]
Pr[pi(v′) = y]
≤ e
where Range(pi) denotes every possible output of the algorithm pi.
For -LDP the privacy loss is captured by . For  = 0 perfect privacy is
ensured as exp(0) = 1 while  = ∞ gives no privacy guarantee. It is important
to note however that the choice of  is crucial in practice as the increase in privacy
risks is proportional to exp(). Thus a privacy loss of exp(1) and exp(50) have
very different implications [24].
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Randomized response Although Local Differential Privacy has only recently
been gaining traction and popularity, the ideas behind it are much older. The
key idea of Local Differential Privacy is randomized response, a surveying tech-
nique first introduced by Warner in [28]. This survey technique can be used to
get more accurate statistics on topics where survey respondents would like to
remain confidentiality. To answer the question the respondent first toss a coin
in secret and answers truthfully only if the coin comes up heads. In case of
tails the respondent tosses a second coin in secret and answers “Yes” if the coin
comes up tails and answers “No” if the coin comes up heads. This preserves
respondents’ privacy by giving them strong plausible deniability while allowing
for computation of accurate population statistics.
Given that respondents comply with the protocol, respondents will answer
the question truthfully 75% of the time. An accurate estimate of the true number
of “Yes” answers can therefore be computed by 2(X−0.25) where X refers to the
fraction of respondents who answered in the positive. The survey participants
are given a privacy guarantee of  = ln( 0.751−0.75 ) = ln(3) [14].
Although randomized response is a very basic LDP mechanism it is used in
many more sophisticated LDP algorithms. One such implementation utilizing
randomized response is RAPPOR from Google [14] which uses a variation of
randomized response and combines it with bloom filters. We will describe this
implementation in more detail in section 2.2.
2.1 Challenges in the local model
As the local model does not use any centralized database and instead enables
collection of statistics from a distributed set of inputs while maintaining privacy
it has gained a lot of popularity in recent years and even been adopted by Ap-
ple [1] and Google [14]. However the local model comes with its own challenges.
Specifically it is more difficult to construct efficient LDP protocols and main-
taining a low error-bound. Bassily et al. [3] give a good example of noise in the
local model: when trying to estimate the number of HIV positives, it suffices to
add Laplace noise of magnitude O(1/) in a centralized database which is inde-
pendent of the number of n participants. In the local model however a very high
number of participants is needed because the lower-bound of Ω(
√
n/) is depen-
dent on n [6]. As [3] recognizes this makes low time, space, and communication
complexity on the user side in a practical implementation invaluable.
2.2 Practical implementations
RAPPOR One real world deployment of LDP has been made by Google in the
form of RAPPOR [14] in Google Chrome. The source code of its implementation
has also been published online and can be adopted and implemented by others1.
Google has been interested in using LDP to collect statistics of its Google Chrome
browser to gain better insights in its usage without compromising the user’s
1 https://github.com/google/rappor
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privacy. Erlingsson et al. [14] present an algorithm that enables such a privacy-
preserving collection of usage statistics.
Responses to the server can be assumed to be a bit vector of length k where
each bit represents some property. For collection of statistics on categorical prop-
erties such as whether a user belongs to a group or uses a certain one bit is needed
for each category. Therefore a bit vector of length k can provide information on k
different categorical properties. In order to collect numerical values the response
bits can for instance be mapped to ranges of values which are then reported.
However it is also possible to collect statistics on non-categorical properties by
use of Bloom filters in combination with randomized response.
In particular to report a value v it is added to the bloom filter B of size k
using h hash functions. Then, in order to guarantee the user’s privacy, a variation
of randomized response called permanent randomized response is applied first
and then a second variation called instantaneous randomized response is applied
second. Permanent randomized response only determines a single bit vector B′
for each value v which is then memoized and reused every time in place of the
real answer. This is done to ensure that no inference of the user’s real answer is
possible even if a value is reported multiple times. To compute the permanent
randomized response given the user’s longitudinal privacy guarantee parameter
f , for each bit i in B a reporting value B′i is determined:
B′i =

1, with probability 12f
0, with probability 12f
Bi, with probability 1− f
Each time the value v is reported the bit vector B′ is reused to compute the ac-
tual response bit vector S of length k using instantaneous randomized response.
Instantaneous randomized response works by perturbing each bit of B′ with
randomized response parameters p, q. First a bit vector S is initialized and all
values are set to 0. Then each bit i of S is set with probabilities
P (Si = 1) =
{
q, if B′i = 1
p, if B′i = 0
Finally the vector S is sent to the server.
Additionally Erlingsson et al. present a few modifications of the RAPPOR
algorithm. One-time RAPPOR is a modification that does not require protec-
tion against longitudinal attacks, i.e. inference attacks on observations of mul-
tiple transmissions, as it is only a one-time report of a value. In this case the
instantaneous randomized response step can be skipped and the result of di-
rect randomization B′ transmitted instead. Basic RAPPOR is a variation which
is equivalent to the previously mentioned collection of statistics on categorical
properties. Given a well-defined and small set of strings each of the strings can be
mapped directly to one of the bits in the bit vector instead of using a bloom filter.
Basic one-time RAPPOR is the combination of the two variations. Permanent
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randomized response satisfies 1-LDP where
1 = 2h ln
(
1− 12f
1
2f
)
As the probability of observing a 1 in the instantaneous randomized response
step is a function of both p, q and f we calculate probabilities of observing a 1
given that the underlying Bloom filter bit was set or was not set as follows:
q′ = P (Si = 1|bi = 1) = 1
2
f(p+ q) + (1− f)q (1)
p′ = P (Si = 1|bi = 0) = 1
2
f(p+ 1) + (1− f)p (2)
Then, given (1) and (2), instantaneous randomized response satisfies 2-LDP
with
2 = h ln
(
q′(1− p′)
p′(1− q′)
)
Apple’s implementation of LDP Another real-world deployment of LDP has
been made by Apple [1] who use it to collect usage statistics to better understand
user behavior and improve the user experience. Apple has been most interested
in the problem of frequency estimation. One such example is the estimation of
frequently used emojis while maintaining users’ privacy by use of LDP. To give
its users -LDP guarantees, Apple uses count-mean sketch (CMS), which is a
variation of count-min sketch [8], a probabilistic sublinear space data structure
that allows for efficient operations on data streams.
On the server-side this implementation uses a sketch matrix M of dimensions
k ×m with k hash functions. The client then maps domain elements d ∈ D to
size m allowing for a reasonable transmission size that does not impact the user.
Similarly to the count operation in count-min sketch, a frequency estimate for a
domain element d ∈ D can be computed by averaging the counts corresponding
to the according k hash functions in M . Instead of taking the minimum count in
M like in count-min sketch, the average count is computed in order to provide
better accuracy for randomly perturbed sketch matrices.
On the client-side, in order to transmit a data entry d ∈ D while maintaining
-LDP for a given privacy parameter  > 0, a hash functions h out of the available
k hash functions is chosen uniformly at random. Then, for an encoding vector
v ∈ {−1, 1}m the entry at position h(d) is set to 1 and every other entry is set to
-1. At least, much like in randomized response, each bit of the encoding vector v
is flipped with probability 1
1+e/2
. This vector is then transmitted to the server
where the sketch matrix M is updated accordingly.
Apple also presents another variation of CMS in [1] called Hadamard count-
mean sketch (HCMS) which makes use of the Hadamard transform to achieve
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a similar variance to CMS while only transmitting a single bit to the server.
However both CMS and HCMS assume that there is some known dictionary
of domain elements which the server can query to find counts for all its data
entries and to create a histogram. Apple presents an algorithm called Sequence
Fragment Puzzle (SFP) which allows for calculation of histograms on unknown
dictionaries. One example application of this is the discovery of new popular
words that are not yet included in a phone’s dictionary while maintaining -
LDP.
There has been some criticism of the practical deployment of LDP by Apple
however. Although the algorithms presented can ensure users’ privacy the choice
of the privacy loss parameter  is important. Tang et al. [24] criticize the lack
of transparency in the choice of privacy loss permitted by the system. Upon
closer examination of Apple’s actual implementation they found that although
a privacy loss of  = 1 or  = 2 was guaranteed for single transmissions, Apple
allowed up to 16 such transmissions per day meaning the upper bound for privacy
loss is as high as  = 16 per day. This shows that although first steps to adopt -
LDP in practice have been taken, not all implementations provide equal privacy
guarantees or even transparency of what the privacy guarantees given are.
2.3 Frequency Oracles
One core problem of LDP is locally private frequency estimation. Given a domain
D a frequency oracle (FO) is a protocol which estimates the frequency of an
element d ∈ D. A basic FO protocol has first been proposed in [28].
Wang et al. [26] introduce an abstract framework which several other FO
protocols can be placed in. They divide FO protocols into three main steps: for
each question, the user encodes their answer, perturbs the encoded value and
sends it to the aggregator who obtains a frequency estimate for each answer
of the question by decoding the reported values. The generalized framework
provides several improvements in accuracy over previous algorithms such as the
basic RAPPOR protocol [14]. First Wang et al. define pure LDP protocols given
PE, the composition of the encoding and perturbation algorithms, and Support,
which maps each output y to a set of inputs that support that are supported by
the output value y, as follows:
Definition 3. A protocol given by PE and Support is pure if and only if there
exist two probability values p∗ > q∗ such that for all v1,
Pr[PE(v1) ∈ {y | v1 ∈ Support(y)}] = p∗
∀v2 6=v1Pr[PE(v2) ∈ {y | v1 ∈ Support(y)}] = q∗
We call {y | v1 ∈ Support(y)} the support set of v1. Then, p∗ represents the
probability that any value v1 is mapped to its own support set and q
∗ denotes
the probability that any other value is mapped to the support set of v1. In order
to satisfy -LDP we must have q∗ > 0 as it must be possible for a different value
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to be mapped to the support set of v1 and specifically it is required that
p∗
q∗ ≤ e.
Pure LDP requires that p∗ be the same for all values and q∗ be the same for all
pairs of values.
In a pure LDP setting the true frequency c(i) of a value i can be estimated by
counting reported outputs that support i. However, because of the perturbation
step we expect to see at least n · q∗ and at most n · p∗ outputs that support i.
This unbiased estimate is given by
cˆ(i) =
∑
j 1Support(yj)(i)− nq∗
p∗ − q∗ (3)
where yj is the value submitted by user j.
Next Wang et al. introduce their framework of pure LDP FO protocols which
generalize many previously proposed protocols. They introduce four distinct
types of protocols that utilize different encoding techniques. For two protocols
they propose their own variants with optimal parameters (Optimized Unary En-
coding and Optimized Local Hashing). As all of the protocols are pure LDP
protocols the frequency of any value d ∈ D can be estimated by (3).
Direct Encoding (DE) Direct Encoding is the generalization of the basic FO
protocol by Warner [28] with Encode(v) = v. The values are then perturbed
with
Pr[Perturb(x) = i] =
{
p = e

e+|D|−1 , if i = x
q = 1−p|D|−1 =
1
e+|D|−1 , if i 6= x
The support function is SupportDE(i) = {i}. The aggregator can estimate the
frequency of any value d ∈ D using (3). However, as the variance is linear in |D|
the accuracy suffers for bigger domains.
Histogram Encoding (HE) Histogram Encoding uses a histogram of length
|D| to encode each input d ∈ D. Specifically, for a value v its encoding is a
vector of length |D| in which each entry is 0.0 and only the v-th component
equals 1.0. This vector is then perturbed using the Laplace distribution such
that B′[i] = B[i] + Lap(β) with Pr[Lap(β) = x] = 12β e
−|x|/β . For aggregation,
Wang et al. present two techniques: Summation with Histogram Encoding (SHE)
which sums up the reported noisy histograms from all users and is not a pure
LDP protocol, and Thresholding with Histogram Encoding (THE) which is pure
and interprets each noisy count above a threshold θ as a 1 and each count below
θ as a 0. Its support function is given by SupportTHE(B) = {v | B[v] > θ}. As
noise of large magnitude does not sum up when using a threshold the variance
of THE is lower than that of SHE.
Unary Encoding (UE) In Unary Encoding a value is encoded as a bit vector
similarly to the approach used in the basic RAPPOR protocol [14]. Specifically
a value v is encoded as a bit vector where only the v-th position equals 1 and
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all other positions equal 0. Given probabilities p, q the perturbed output B′ is
computed as follows:
Pr[B′[i] = 1] =
{
p, if B[i] = 1
q, if B[i] = 0
Depending on the choice of p and q Wang et al. differentiate between Sym-
metric Unary Encoding (SUE) which uses p + q = 1 and is equivalent to basic
RAPPOR [14] and their own variant Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) with
p = 12 and q =
1
e+1 which are optimal parameters that minimize the error. UE’s
support function is SupportUE(B) = {i | B[i] = 1}.
Binary Local Hashing (BLH) They key idea behind Binary Local Hashing is
that communication cost can be lowered by hashing the input values to a domain
of size k < |D|. BLH is logically equivalent to the random matrix-base protocol
proposed by Bassily et al. [4]. Consider a universal family of hash functions H,
such that each hash function h ∈ H hashes an input d ∈ D into one bit, and
such that the family’s universal property is given by
∀x, y ∈ D, x 6= y : PrH∈H[H(x) = H(y)] ≤ 1
2
.
A user’s input v can now be encoded as Encode(v) = 〈H, b〉 with H ∈ H chosen
uniformly at random and b = H(v). Given  and the input bit b the perturbed
input 〈H, b′〉 is given by
Pr[b′ = 1] =
{
p = e

e+1 , if b = 1
q = 1e+1 , if b = 0
Its support function is SupportBLH(〈H, b〉) = {v | H(v) = b}. It is important to
note that each reported value 〈H, b〉 supports half of the input values d ∈ D as
the output is only a single bit of information.
Optimal Local Hashing (OLH) As Wang et al. observe that information is
lost in BLH as the output is only a single bit they generalize BLH and propose
Optimal Local Hashing (OLH) which instead hashes each input value into a value
in [g] where g ≥ 2. The choice of g is crucial as a larger value allows for more
information to be preserved in the encoding step but leads to more information
being lost in the random response step. They analytically determine the optimal
parameter to be g = e + 1.
Given a universal family of hash functions H such that for every H ∈ H any
input d ∈ D is mapped to a value in [g]. Then, a user input v is again encoded
as Encode(v) = 〈H, b〉 with b = H(v) for H ∈ H chosen uniformly at random.
The perturbed output is 〈H, b′〉 where
∀i∈[g]Pr[b′ = i] =
{
p = e

e+g−1 , if b = i
q = 1e+g−1 , if b 6= i
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Its support function is given by SupportOLH(〈H, b′〉) = {i | H(i) = b′}.
Wang et al. observe that OLH and OUE have the exact same variance and
values for p∗ and q∗ although they use different approaches to encoding. OLH
has a lower communication cost of O(log |D|) compared to OUE’s cost of O(|D|).
However, as these two protocols use different optimized encoding approaches but
yield the exact same variance Wang et al. suggest that it is possible that these
protocols may be optimal for large domains D.
Finally, they analyzed which LDP protocol is best depending on the size of
the domain D. They came to the conclusion that DE is best for small domains
with |D| < 3e + 2, and that OUE and OLH are better for domains |D| >
3e + 2. However, as OUE has communication cost Θ(|D|) we should use OLH
for domains where the communication cost becomes too big as it offers the same
accuracy at lower communication cost of O(log |D|).
2.4 Heavy Hitter Identification
In the heavy hitter identification problem in the local model we wish to esti-
mate the frequency of common domain elements (heavy hitters) among a set of
users. For small domains this can be done by using a simple frequency oracle
protocol and estimating the frequency of all domain elements. This approach is
computationally infeasible for larger domains however. The problem of heavy
hitter identification is very well studied [3,4,5,16,19,22]. As the error bound for
efficient heavy hitter protocols presented by Mishra et al. [19] and Hsu et al. [16]
is higher, we will focus on more recent work by Bassily and Smith [4] Bassily et
al. [3] and Bun et al. [5].
Formally we consider a set of n users each holding an input xi ∈ D. Then S
is a “distributed database” with S = (x1, . . . , xn) consisting of all users’ inputs.
Bun et al. [5] define a domain element x ∈ D as ∆-heavy if its multiplicity in S
is at least ∆. This condition is satisfied if there are at least ∆ users who hold
the input x. For ∆ as small as possible we want to find all ∆-heavy elements
(i.e. heavy hitters). As all domain elements with multiplicities smaller than ∆
are not excluded, the parameter ∆ is also referred to as the protocol’s error.
An efficient protocol for heavy hitter identification has been presented by
Bassily and Smith [4]. First Bassily and Smith construct a protocol for compu-
tation of succinct histograms (S-Hist) that satisfies -LDP. A succinct histogram
is a data structure which provides a list of heavy hitters (v1, . . . , vn) and their
estimated frequencies fˆ(vi) : i ∈ [n]. The error of a succinct histogram is given
by the Chebyshev distance `∞ between the estimated and actual frequency as
maxv∈D|fˆ(v)−f(v)|. Then, in order to keep communication cost low Bassily and
Smith present a transformation that can transform any (, 0)-DP local protocol
into a 1-bit protocol given that it uses a public coin model where both user and
server have access to a common random string. Such a protocol only requires
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each user to send a single bit to the server for the statistical query to be com-
puted. Using this transformation they finally transform the succinct histogram
protocol into a 1-bit protocol.
Bassily et al. revisit the problem in [3] and present new efficient heavy hitter
algorithms TreeHist and Bitstogram which achieve near-optimal worst-case error
while improving server time complexity to O˜(n) and user time complexity to
O˜(1). We will give a short overview over the TreeHist and Bitstogram algorithms
below.
TreeHist For TreeHist a binary prefix tree whose leaves correspond to do-
main elements is constructed. The algorithm then scans the levels of the tree
starting at the top level and pruning all nodes and their children which cannot
be prefixes of a heavy hitters by making queries to a given frequency oracle
for that prefix. Finally, when the algorithm reaches the bottom level of the
tree, the heavy hitters and a more accurate estimate of their frequencies can
be determined using the frequency oracle. The number of surviving nodes does
not exceed O
(√
n/(log(d) · log(n))) with high probability and therefore at most
O
(√
n log(d)/log(n)
)
nodes are queried with the frequency oracle.
Bitstogram In the Bitstogram protocol every user j ∈ [n] has access to a matrix
Z ∈ {−1, 1}d×n chosen uniformly at random for a domain D of size |D| = d.
Every user j can then send a randomized response of their input vj using the
corresponding bit Z[vj , j] from the public matrix Z: they send yj = Z[vj , j]
with probability 12 +

2 and yj = −Z[vj , j] with probability 12 − 2 . A frequency
oracle that estimates the frequency a(v) of a domain element v ∈ D can then be
constructed as follows:
a(v) =
1

·
∑
j∈[n]
yj · Z[v, j]
To identify heavy hitters the input domain is hashed into a domain of size
T =
√
n where n is the number of users. Given a database S` = (h(vj), vj [`])j∈[n])
for a random hash function h : D → [T ] and an input vj ∈ D where vj [`] is the
`-th bit of vj , the entry (h(x), x[i]) will have a significantly higher count than
(h(x),¬x[i]) for a heavy hitter x. This then allows for recovery of all bits of x
using the frequency oracle.
Most recent research on frequency oracles and heavy hitter algorithms has
focused on minimizing the error. However as Bassily and Smith [4] have shown
the lower bound for the worst-case error of these tasks in LDP is at least
Ω( 1
√
n · log|X|). Although the above presented previous work by Bassily and
Smith [4] and Bassily et al. [3] was efficient and had a near-optimal worst-case
error, it had sub-optimal dependency of the error on the failure probability β
(see table 1) [5].
Bun et al. [5] present PrivateExpanderSketch which is a heavy hitter algo-
rithm with optimal theoretical performance. This heavy hitter algorithm is based
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on the frequency oracle Hashtogram in [3]. An overview over the performance of
different heavy hitter algorithms is given in table 1.
Table 1. Table from [5] comparing different heavy hitter algorithms [3,4,5]. O˜ notation
is used to hide logarithmic factors. Parameters are the number of users n, size of the
domain |X|, privacy parameter , and the failure probability β.
Performance metric Bun et al. [5] Bassily et al. [3] Bassily and Smith. [4]
Server Time O˜(n) O˜(n) O˜(n2.5)
User Time O˜(1) O˜(1) O˜(n1.5)
Server Memory O˜(
√
n) O˜(
√
n) O˜(n2)
User Memory O˜(1) O˜(1) O˜(n1.5)
Communication/user O˜(1) O˜(1) O˜(1)
Public randomness/user O˜(1) O˜(1) O˜(n1.5)
Worst-case error O
(
1

·
√
n log
( |X|
β
))
O
(
1

·
√
n log
( |X|
β
)
log
(
1
β
))
O
(
log1.5( 1
β
)

·√n log|X|)
2.5 Itemset mining
The itemset mining problem deals with the collection of statistics on set-valued
inputs rather than single-valued inputs in a locally differential private setting.
An example for this problem of frequency estimation on set-valued inputs is
given by Thakurta et al. [25]. Here, Apple wants to estimate the frequency of
emojis typed while the user submits a set of emojis that they typed during a
given time period. As frequency oracle and heavy hitter protocols function by
filtering out the added noise through a big enough population size an application
of them to the itemset setting is not possible as transactions may appear only
infrequently while their items and itemsets might appear frequently. Consider
for example transactions {a, b, z}, {a, c, d, z}, {a, e, f, z}. Then we have frequent
itemsets {a}, {z} and {a, z} that all occurred three times even though each
transaction only occurred once.
Most work on this problem is very recent. A first approach to solving heavy
hitter estimation over set-valued data was given by Qin et al. [22] who present a
mechanism called LDPMiner. This mechanism works in a two-phase framework:
in the first phase the items are filtered and potential heavy hitters are identified,
in the second phase the frequency estimates are refined. -LDP is guaranteed
by splitting the privacy budget  into 1 and 2 which are then allocated to the
two phases. Phase I then works the same way previous heavy hitter algorithms
did: each user reports their set of inputs under 1-LDP and a list of kmax items
with the highest frequency is estimated. To achieve higher accuracy the data
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collector then broadcasts this set of kmax items to all users. In Phase II each
user then reports their inputs with 2-LDP – however this time the domain is
reduced to the kmax candidate items and therefore allowing for computation of
a higher accuracy estimate.
Qin et al. use a sampling randomizer algorithm to deal with the itemset set-
ting. Here, instead of reporting their entire itemset, each user randomly samples
an item which they subsequently report. Assuming that every user would nor-
mally submit a set of ` items, the frequency oracle should multiply the estimated
frequency by ` to achieve an unbiased estimate. However, it is important that
users with less than ` items pad their itemset before sampling while users with
more than ` items simply generate a new set of exactly ` items by random sample
without replacement. Without padding the probability of any item being chosen
during the sampling process is hard to assess which makes it hard to compute
an unbiased frequency estimate.
Based on this sampling randomizer algorithm they present sampling succinct
histogram (sampling SH), which is a variant of succinct histogram (S-Hist) by
Bassily et al. [4], as well as a variant of RAPPOR [14] called sampling RAPPOR.
These sampling-randomizer-based methods can then be used in Phase I and II
of the LDPMiner mechanism.
Work by Wang et al. [27] proposes a new Set-Value Item Mining (SVIM)
protocol to find frequent items in the set-valued setting which provides signifi-
cantly higher accuracy than LDPMiner as well as the Set-Value itemSet Mining
(SVSM) protocol which can be used to identify frequent itemsets rather than
single items. Previous to this work, identifying frequent itemsets had still been
an open problem as LDPMiner focused on identifying only frequent items (i.e.
singleton itemsets) rather than itemsets.
Wang et al. investigate padding-and-sample-based frequency oracles (PSFO)
in regards to the effect of privacy amplification which has previously been studied
in the standard DP setting [18]. Consider the sampling randomizer algorithm
from [22]. Since the sampling step randomly selects an item, it provides an
amplification effect in terms of privacy. As each item is selected with a probability
β = 1` the frequency oracle can be invoked with an 
′ = ln(` · (e` − 1) + 1) ≥ )
while still guaranteeing -LDP.
They found that whether such a privacy amplification effect applies depends
on the FO protocol used. Generalized Random Response and Optimized Local
Hash were found to be the best performing FO protocols by [26], however while
the former benefits from the privacy amplification effect the latter does not.
Wang et al. therefore propose to adaptively select the best FO protocol based
on the size of the item domain |I|,  and `. Due to the amplification effect
Generalized Random Response should be used for any
|I| > (4`2 − `) · e + 1
They further note that the choice of ` is crucial a choice too small can lead to
estimation errors while a choice too big may magnify noise in the estimation of
the frequency oracle.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the SVIM and SVSM protocols from [27]. Users (left) are parti-
tioned into five groups. Aggregator (right) runs SVIM to identify frequent items with
first three groups, then SVSM to identify frequent itemsets with last two groups.
The SVIM protocol works similarly to LDPMiner but makes use of the pri-
vacy amplification effect to achieve a higher accuracy. The protocol works in four
steps. The users are partitioned in three groups, each participating in one tasks.
It is shown in [26] that this provides improved accuracy. In the first step users
report inputs with small ` and the aggregator identifies heavy hitter candidates
which are subsequently broadcasted back to the users. Second, using a standard
FO protocol, users report back to the aggregator the number of candidate items
they have. The aggregator can then choose an appropriate ` which is broad-
casted to users. Third, users can report their candidate items using PSFO with
the given `. This allows the aggregator to create frequency estimates for these
items. Finally, the aggregator identifies the k most frequent items. The known
size distribution from step two can be used to further correct undercounts of
these items.
The task of mining itemsets is much more challenging as there are exponen-
tially more candidates to consider. To address this Wang et al. introduce SVSM
which can find frequent itemsets effectively. The protocol first applies SVIM to
find frequent items and to reduce the range of possible itemsets to a manageable
size. Using the list of k most frequent items a candidate set of itemsets IS can
be constructed. One can then map this problem to the regular frequent item
mining problem and apply SVIM to find the most frequent itemsets.
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SVIM significantly outperforms LDPMiner while SVSM solves a previously
open problem. Both are the state-of-the-art in frequency estimation on set-valued
inputs.
2.6 Private Spatial Data Collection
Many services such as Google Maps or Waze benefit from collection of user
data to identify popular locations and to create traffic congestion maps. Given
a large number of users’ and their location data, we would like to learn their
distribution over a spatial domain while maintaining user privacy. This problem
has previously been studied in the centralized differential privacy setting [9,21].
Chen et al. [7] introduce the notion of personalized local differential privacy
(PLDP) and propose a framework that can learn the user distribution over a
spatial domain (location universe) while guaranteeing PLDP for each user.
As the location universe is a large domain in most real-world settings, -LDP
can not be maintained when one wants to obtain reasonably accurate results.
Chen et al. therefore introduce the notion of personalized local differential privacy
(PLDP) which enables users to control their own privacy settings individually
by setting their own privacy parameters:
Definition 4. Given the personalized privacy specification (τ, ) of a user u, a
randomized algorithm pi satisfies (τ, )-personalized local differential privacy for
u, if for two locations l, l′ ∈ τ and any O ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[pi(l) ∈ O]
Pr[pi(l′) ∈ O] ≤ e

where the probability space is over the coin flips of pi.
Here, τ determines a user’s safe region which they feel do not mind to reveal
but don’t want others learning about any more fine-grained location data than
that. PLDP is a generalized version of -LDP as τ = L for a location universe
L implies regular -LDP.
Chen et al. then introduce the private spatial data aggregation (PSDA)
framework. To estimate the number of users in a given region they define the
personalized count estimation protocol (PCEP). Given n users’ locations, their
privacy specifications and a confidence parameter β which determines the accu-
racy, this protocol estimates user counts for each region. The reported locations
for each user are perturbed using a local randomizer which guarantees (τ, )-
PLDP. Next, they define user groups as sets of users with the same safe region
and partition these user groups into clusters to minimize the maximum absolute
error maxl∈L |sˆl−sl| for true and estimated user counts sˆl and sl in the location
universe L. The untrusted server can then apply PCEP for each cluster Ci ∈ C
with a confidence parameter β|C| so that the overall confidence level is guaranteed
to be β. Finally the server calculates counts for all locations by combining the
estimates from all clusters accordingly.
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3 Open problems in LDP
As Local Differential Privacy is still a relatively new field some questions still
remain open. Recent work by Avent et al. [2] has proposed a new hybrid model
which allows users to choose between the local and the centralized model. Since
accuracy can suffer in the pure LDP setting, as LDP gives users very strong
privacy guarantees, this hybrid approach can provide improvements in accuracy.
The approach by Avent et al. provides a blended algorithm for local search that
can combine information from both the central and the local model. As their
work focuses on local search, which is an application of heavy hitter identifica-
tion, it remains open how this hybrid model can be applied to other problems
in LDP and how much of a benefit it can provide.
It has been previously demonstrated that deep learning models can be trained
while preserving differential privacy. It has also been demonstrated that some
machine learning algorithms like linear regression, logistic regression and SVM
classification can be successfully applied in the LDP setting [20]. It is still open
however whether deep learning models can be trained in the LDP setting.
Recent research by Qin et al. [23] has presented a new approach to generate
representative synthetic social graphs in an LDP setting using multiple rounds of
interactions between the server and the user where based new queries are made
based on previous responses. Qin et al. were able to improve the protocol’s accu-
racy using this multi-phase interaction. It is still open how other LDP protocols
can benefit from multiple interactions.
4 Conclusion
In recent years LDP has risen to popularity and seen its first real-world deploy-
ments. We have presented and discussed some of these deployments such as [14]
and [1] that are used by hundreds of millions of users every day. Today LDP
is the state-of-the-art approach to give strong privacy guarantees to users while
enabling organizations to collect usage statistics on their products using locally
private protocols. We have given an overview over the guarantees -LDP can pro-
vide as well as the pure LDP setting by [26]. As frequency estimation is at the
core of many LDP protocols we have given an in-depth overview over different
and optimized frequency oracle protocols in the pure LDP setting introduced by
[26]. Furthermore, we have presented the core problems in LDP such as locally
private heavy hitter identification, itemset mining and spatial data collection.
Finally, we have given a short outlook on the future of LDP and recent research
directions. Further research is necessary to determine how hybrid models [2],
that give the user the freedom to choose between the central and local setting,
and multi-phase interaction protocols [23] can be applied to other LDP problems
and what their theoretical boundaries are.
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